

Hieronymus Ciceronianus

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The ancient concept of *amicitia* survived with adaptations in early Christian thought. Friendship—paideutic in Theognis (27–28), partisan in Thucydides (3.82.6–8), civic virtue in Aristotle (*EN* 1155A23–29), in Cicero often a political bond thinly disguised by courtesy and affection—persisted in new forms: the polis became the *civitas Dei*; the citizens, the believers. But the Christian city of God soon lost its unity. Could Christian sectarianism be in some way related to ancient *amicitia*? In the writings of Eusebius Hieronymus, two facts seem significant here: the self-accusation of his own conscience or subconscious in the famous dream, *non Christianus sed Ciceronianus*, and the political tone of his enmities, as deep and bitter as any of Theognis or Cicero. Might something of the political bias of Ciceronian *amicitia* have carried over into Jerome's thought and feeling, providing a convenient vehicle for his animosities?

In the post-Nicean world of Jerome, doctrinal disputes, intensified by awakening nationalism, as in Egypt, became passionate and divisive. The supporters of one school of theology came to abuse their opponents and praise their own leaders as inspired by God and infallible; verbal hostility led to deeds of violence. Tolerance and moderation were branded as betrayal of the truth. Dogmatic zeal exempted Christians from charity and forgiveness. State intervention was welcomed by the contesting parties.¹ This is only too reminiscent of Thucydides' description of the civil wars that destroyed the Greek cities from within and of Cicero's identification of his own "party" with the state, all other parties with treason. True, the Monophysites and Arians, Origenists and anti-Origenists did not need Greek or Roman exemplars (Cf. 1 Cor. 1:11 ff.). But in Jerome, who knew Cicero so well, it

¹ Nicholas Zernov, *Eastern Christendom, a Study of the Origin and Development of the Eastern Orthodox Church* (London 1960) 48.

may be that this "unchristian" attitude was justified unconsciously by Ciceronian principles.

This paper will first discuss briefly the political aspect of Ciceronian *amicitia* before investigating the relationship of *sapientia* and *amicitia* in Cicero and in Jerome.

The problematic relationship between *amicitia* and political power in the late Republic has generated an extensive literature that in general presents two opposed views: the one identifying *amicitia* with political bonds, the other upholding its ideal character of genuine and disinterested affection uniting good men who find in each other an *alter ego*.² A recent statement of the latter point of view is that of P. A. Brunt.³ Mr. Brunt bases his description of Cicero's ideal friendship on the *Laelius*. This treatise derives less from Greek philosophy than from the life in Rome to which it constantly refers; it therefore should be "taken seriously as an expression of Roman experience."⁴ The main body of the paper is devoted to illustrating the complexity of *amicitia* in Roman political affairs. Mr. Brunt here emphasizes the courtesy that concealed hostility under terms of friendship, the reluctance to display overt hostility to former friends, the general unwillingness of the aristocracy to encompass or see the ruin of one of their own class, and above all, the bewildering, ever-shifting, kaleidoscopic combinations of political figures in the late Republic. He concludes that the range of *amicitia* is vast, the term itself ambiguous, its exact nuance in any particular context difficult or impossible to ascertain and that, therefore, the fact of disinterested friendship should not be denied; only a belief in its existence can justify the manifold pretenses to *vera amicitia*.⁵

J. Hellegouarc'h stresses a point of significance here: *amicitia* could obviously not mean in Rome a "political party" in the modern sense, but it is natural to all men everywhere to base political on personal relations.⁶ What is peculiar to Rome, how-

² Lily Ross Taylor, *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar* (Berkeley 1949) 7-11; Theodor Mommsen, *The History of Rome*, ed. D. A. Saunders and H. Collins (New York 1958) 8-9; cf. A. M. Guillemin, *Plin et l'art littéraire de son temps* (Paris 1929) 3; Ronald Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939) 157. Also J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire Latin des relations et des partis politiques sous le République* (Paris 1963).

³ "'Amicitia' in the Late Roman Republic," *Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society* 191, n.s. 2 (1965) 1-20.

⁴ Brunt (above, note 3) 1-2, 4.

⁵ Brunt (above, note 3) 11-13, 20.

⁶ Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 5-6, 41.

ever, is the extent to which this basic human tendency developed. The social and constitutional structure of the Republic gave preponderant value to the personal factor in political combinations due to the very absence of organized "parties". *Amicitia* itself was, in fact, a true organization.⁷ Hellegouarc'h does not belittle Cicero's ideal of *vera et perfecta amicitia*, the *familiaritates sapientium*,⁸ but points out the inner contradiction of Cicero's position—exalting the essential disinterestedness of *vera amicitia* and yet insisting that the duty of the *amici* is to help advance each other's political careers.⁹ Further, Cicero restricts *amicitia* to the *boni*, who are in fact members of a certain social class, whose *virtus* is lack of need (i.e. it is affluence, power), and who tend to be those of the same political alignment as the speaker, while the *impii*, the *improbi*, and the *mali* are his adversaries,¹⁰ although, as Brunt points out, these combinations are ever shifting.

The following study of Cicero's concept of *amicitia* and *sapientia* is based largely on the *Laelius*, a late dialogue and hence a guide to what Cicero always felt.¹¹ This paper does not deny the existence of disinterested friendship which is as universally human as political friendship, although more rare. The totally different tone of Cicero's letters to Atticus in comparison with that of many of his other letters is proof enough of his capacity for true affection. The bond between C. Matius and Julius Caesar is also a *locus classicus* for disinterested friendship.¹² Cicero's friendship for Caelius survived the latter's shift of allegiance to Caesar (*Fam.* 2.8–16; 8.1–17). His letters to C. Marius express *amicitia* based on *sapientia* (*Fam.* 7.1.1) and true affection (*Fam.* 7.1.6, 3.1). The facetious letters to Papirius Paetus (*Fam.* 9.15–26) show friendship based on qualities of *sermo*, *litterae*, *humanitas* (*Fam.* 3.9.1).¹³ The emphasis of the paper, however, will be on the two opposing kinds

⁷ Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 49.

⁸ Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 42. See *Lael.* 22, 76, 100.

⁹ Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 45–46. See *Lael.* 73.

¹⁰ Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 46, 488–89.

¹¹ Cf. Brunt (above, note 3) 3.

¹² It has however been called by some "purely political." Cf. Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 47–48; A. Heuss, "Cicero und Matius, zur Psychologie der revolutionären Situation in Rom," *Historia* 5 (1956) 53–73; R. Combes, *REL* 36 (1959) 176 ff. For Atticus, see D. R. Shackleton Bailey, *Cicero's Letters to Atticus*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge 1965) 3 ff.

¹³ Cf. Brunt (above, note 3) 5. I would like to thank the referee of this paper for his helpful suggestions, reflected in the above paragraphs.

of *sapientia* which we find again in Jerome, *sapientiae* that create friendship or enmity, political in character.

Laelius is chosen to discuss friendship in the *De Amicitia* not only because he is famous for his friendship (*familiaritas*) with Scipio Africanus (4)¹⁴ but also because Laelius was reputed *sapiens*. Cicero distinguishes the *sapientia* of Laelius from that of Cato on the one hand and from that of the ideal Stoic on the other. In his old age Cato was given the cognomen *sapiens* because of his practical wisdom: "quia multarum rerum usum habebat; multa eius et in senatu et in foro vel provisa prudenter vel acta constanter vel responsa acute ferebantur" (6). This is a wisdom of *natura* and *mores* (6) and acknowledged by the commonality (*sicut vulgus*); that of Laelius, however, was a *sapientia* derived from *studium* and *doctrina*, a *sapientia* appreciated by *eruditi* alone (6-7).

Yet the dialogue does not entirely dismiss Cato's wisdom. There is implied an identification of Cato and Cicero himself: "itaque ipse mea legens sic adficio interdum ut Catonem, non me loqui existimem" (4). Cicero puts in Laelius' mouth a vindication of Catonian-Ciceronian wisdom: "cave Catoni anteponas ne istum quidem ipsum quem Apollo ut ais sapientissimum iudicavit; huius enim facta, illius dicta laudantur" (10). This *sapientia* is political sagacity, tenacity (*Fam.* 1.5.4; 6.12.4; 3.10.1) and flexibility (*Fam.* 1.9.18; 7.28.1). Cato's deeds show him wiser than Socrates himself, for deeds are more than words.

Laelius, whose relation to Scipio resembles that of Atticus to Cicero (15, 79, 103-4), is not wise precisely in Cato's manner of purely political experience and sagacity (6). His wisdom consists in this, that he finds in himself all his resources (*natura*, *mores*, *studium*, and *doctrina*) and sets all that can happen to him from outside far below interior virtue: "hanc esse in te sapientiam existumant ut omnia tua in te posita esse ducas humanosque casus virtute inferiores putes" (7; cf. *Fam.* 5.13.1). Yet he is not simply a Stoic or Epicurean sage. Cicero has Fannius suggest that Laelius' wisdom, since it is that acknowledged by the *eruditi*, ranks him with Socrates, the only true *sapiens* of the Greeks according to those "qui ista subtilius quaerunt" and who deny the title *sapiens* to the seven wise men of Greece (7). Scipio does not believe that Bias, one of the seven sages, could have given the cynical advice:

¹⁴ Numbers in parentheses in the following portion of this paper refer to sections of the *Laelius*.

Love a friend as if he will become an enemy—this is the word of a man *impurus* or *ambitiosus* (59). However, Plutarch suggests that the famous cognomen, *sapiens*, was won by Laelius when he chose to be loyal to his own class rather than openly support the dispossessed.¹⁵ This seems to put Laelius, in spite of his learning, in Cato's class and to make his wisdom also a form of political shrewdness.

The feeble friendships approved by Epicureans and Stoics are criticized (44–48) because their wise man must put his own *securitas* (47) and freedom from *dolor*, *cura*, *molestia* (48) first and reject any possibility of suffering or pain. This is wishful and egotistical thinking.¹⁶ Laelius' own concept of *virtus* and *sapientia* is not like this, *inhumana* (50). *Virtus* is the source and strength of friendship, *et conciliat amicitias et conservat* (100).¹⁷ Nothing is better than this gift of the gods that Cicero calls *virtus, sine qua amicitia esse non potest* (104), parent and preserver of friendship, which is also called *sapientia* (20). Laelius holds that friendship can exist only between men of *virtus*, good men, honorable citizens, *boni*; and to be good is to be wise. He does not follow those subtle thinkers, *qui haec subtilius disserunt*, however, when they make *sapientia* something no mortal man has achieved. This is *invidiosus, obscurus*. Laelius names three Romans, C. Fabricius, M^o. Curius, and Tiberius Coruncanius, who certainly were not wise according to the unnamed philosophers, yet who were undeniably *virī boni*, as any Roman patriot would acknowledge. They followed *natura*, he says, employing the Stoic term with the teaching of Antiochus and of Panaetius, the friend of Scipio, in mind, rather than that of Zeno or of Chrysippus. They were men of *fides*, *integritas*, *aequalitas*, *liberalitas*, and *magna constantia*; without *cupiditas*, *libido*, *audacia* (18–19). The *boni* are in fact those with the qualities necessary for a member of the ruling class.¹⁸ Such *virtus* is defined by the standards of normal life, *communis vita*, not by the unreal norms of the learned that no mortal man has attained (18), nor in

¹⁵ Plutarch, *Ti. Gracchus* 8.3. Cf. H. Hill, *The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period* (Oxford 1952) 102; M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire*² (Oxford 1958) 1.21–26, 35. Cf. Brunt (above, note 3) 6, for the similarity of Laelius to Atticus.

¹⁶ *Tusculans* 4.3. H. A. K. Hunt, *The Humanism of Cicero* (Melbourne 1954) 11.

¹⁷ Cf. Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 244–45; *Off.* 1.19; *Pis.* 35; *Mil.* 4; *Rep.* 1.2, 2.24.

¹⁸ Cf. Hunt (above, note 16) 5; Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 486.

their extravagant terms. In giving examples here, he again names Cato, with others—Paulus, Gallus, Scipio, and Philus (20–21).

Friendship springs from the *virtus* or *sapientia* that makes such a man self-sufficient, finding all his resources within himself, *ut nullo eget suaque omnia in se ipso posita iudicet* (29–30). The wise man is the perfect man (21, 100), in so far as man can be perfect. If men had an absolute perfection such as demanded by the Stoics, Laelius says, friends could grant each other whatever they ask. Here Cicero approaches the point where later Aulus Gellius is to criticize him for lack of moral honesty.¹⁹ He holds, however, that men who approach as near to wisdom as is humanly possible, men such as Aemilius Papus and Caius Luscinus or Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius, such men would never ask or grant anything *nefas* (38–39). The good man is the wise man (65) but not impeccable. It is possible for his friendship to turn to enmity; it may even be desirable that this should happen (77–78). What then is the touchstone?

Amicitia is *consensio*, universal in character, *omnium divinarum humanarumque rerum* (20); *consensio voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa* is the whole strength, *vis*, of friendship (15); a friend is one's own image, *exemplar* (23). But Cicero also speaks of a *consensio improborum* (43) which is not *amicitia* but *coniuratio*. Aristotle's "concord" (*ὁμόνοια*) meant *πολιτικὴ φιλία*, the bond between citizens which prevails in a state where the citizens agree in aim, policy, and action.²⁰ Laelius indicates that *amicitia* is just such a political agreement, but of a state within a state, i.e., the political partisanship of the divided Rome of Cicero's day. The friends and friendships mentioned in the dialogue are all political, including the legendary Orestes and Pylades (24). Quintus Pompeius was estranged from Publius Sulpicius Rufus in 88 B.C. when the latter went over to the popular party (2); the friendships of Scipio with Quintus Pompeius and with Metellus were broken by Scipio for political reasons (77). Cicero's *boni* are aristocratic models of friendship, such as C. Fabricius and M'. Curius, for whom all citizens have a friendly feeling even though they have never known

¹⁹ *Noct. Att.* 1.3.11–20. Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 271–74, 568, defines *sapientia* as the skill or tact for acting in the way best for one's own or one's friends' interests; it retains the ancient Roman sense.

²⁰ *EN* 1167A22–B9. Cf. Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) on *consensio* 123–124, *concordia* 125, 127, *coniuratio* 95–97.

them personally (28); so too, with Aemilius Papus and Gaius Luscinius, Manius Curius and Tiberius Coruncanius (39). But Romans feel hostility toward Tarquin the Proud, Spurius Cassius and Spurius Maelius (28), men whose names are symbols of tyranny and of revolution.

The *boni* and the *improbi* cited by Cicero in the *Laelius* fall chiefly into three chronological groups: first, from the very origin of the republic; second, from the third century B.C.; and third, of the time of the Gracchi. They illustrate the relation of political *sapientia* and *amicitia*. The first four, all *improbi*, are legendary figures, exemplars of different forms of *insipientia*. Tarquinius Superbus, the last king, is an archetype of the tyrant. Who is there who does not hate him (28)? His haughtiness and *importunitas* destroyed friendship as he himself admitted (53–54; 89). He was unjust, contemptuous of justice, insolent and uncontrolled; not merely lacking *sapientia*, he lacked humanity, being more repulsive and hateful to gods and men than any living creature; he was monstrous, inhuman, bestial.²¹ Coriolanus is the type of traitor rebel. Cicero compares him to Themistocles. Both had done great service to their country, both rebelled at the ingratitude that repaid them. Both were therefore abandoned and in the end committed suicide (42–43). Here Cicero is again dealing with legend. Coriolanus is a vague, dateless figure, the patriotic aristocrat who can take the wrong direction. The oldest tradition of Fabius mentioned by Livy and the complexities of the tradition are irrelevant for Cicero's purpose, stated in a rhetorical question: if Coriolanus had had friends, should they have joined him in his attack on his fatherland (36)? Irrelevant also is the fact that Coriolanus' revolt was directed against, not for, concessions to the plebs.²² Finally two other aristocrats, Spurius Cassius Vecellinus (consul 502 B.C.) and Spurius Maelius (d. 439 B.C.) are types of over-ambition; both were accused in the aristocratic tradition (or propaganda) of aspiring to become king: *regnum appetentem, regnum occupare voluisse* (36). Who would not hate such men (28) and who could justify helping them by an appeal to friendship (36)?²³

²¹ Cicero, *Rep.* 1.58; 2.44–45, 48; Dion. Hal. 1.75.2; 4.38.

²² Cicero, *Rep.* 2.57; Dion. Hal. 6.91.1–94.2; 7.21.1 ff.; Livy 2.33.4–5, 40.10–11; Plutarch, *Coriolanus* 39.4–5.

²³ Sp. Cassius Vecellinus: Cicero, *Rep.* 2.49.60; Dion. Hal. 5.49.1; 8.59.3, 79.2–3; Livy 2.17.1, 5, 33.3–4. Spurius Maelius: Livy 4.13.4, 9; 4.14.6; 4.16.5 (claim of unmerited death); 4.21.5; Dion. Hal. 12.1.1–4; alternate version 12.4.2–5.

These four figures, then, represent the absence or loss of *sapientia* and the consequent breakdown of human relations: no man should be their friend. Of them may be said what is true of any tyrant: there is no place in their lives for *fides*, *caritas*, *fiducia*,²⁴ i.e., *nullus locus amicitiae* (52–53).

The second group of the third century B.C. are all examples of *boni*: Gaius Fabricius Luscinus, consul 282 and 278 B.C. (18, 28, 38–39); Manius Curius Dentatus, consul 290, 275, 274 B.C. (18, 28, 39); Tiberius Coruncanius, consul 280 B.C., dictator in 246 B.C. (18, 39); Quintus Aemilius Papus, consul 282 and 278 B.C., censor 275 (39). We find here two pairs of friends linked together in a power nucleus: Q. Aemilius and C. Fabricius with M. Curius and Ti. Coruncanius. These men are called not only *sapientes* in the judgment of antiquity (18) but also *sanctissimi viri*; no thought of anything *nefas* could enter into their mutual relations. Their friendship was such that it could never challenge their honor or their obligations. These obligations are threefold: *fides*, *ius iurandum* and the *res publica* (39). If they are listed in order of importance, it is notable that the *res publica* comes after two kinds of political *amicitia*, that based on *fides* (cf. 19, 52–53) and that based on a closer bond sealed by oath, *ius amicitiae* (cf. 35). Their wisdom, acclaimed by *maiores nostri*, was not that inhuman Stoic ideal but one attainable by men (18), and they are remembered with *caritas benevola* (28). Again Cicero selects only what is essential to his point, that men, types of old-fashioned Roman aristocrats, were bound in friendship because of their political orthodoxy.²⁵ Tiberius Gracchus, on the other hand, is described in terms of madness or insanity like the first group of power-seekers:

²⁴ Cf. Hellegouare'h (above, note 2) on *fides* 23–40, *caritas* 147–49.

²⁵ Q. Aemilius Papus: Aul. Gell. 17.21.39; Plut. *Pyrrh.* 21; Dion. Hal. 19.13. Tiberius Coruncanius: Cicero, *De leg.* 2.52; *De sen.* 15, 27, 43. C. Fabricius Luscinus: Cicero, *De leg.* 2.58; *De sen.* 15, 43; Livy, *Epit.* 13–14; Dion. Hal. 19.13–18; 20.13; Plut. *Pyrrh. passim*. Manius Curius Dentatus: Cicero, *Att.* 4.15.5; *De sen.* 15, 43, 55–56; *Rep.* 3.4–7, 40; Livy, *Epit.* 11, 14. Coruncanius with Fabricius and Curius defended the Republic *consilio et auctoritate*; with them he mocked the Epicurean concept of *sapientia*; he taught civil law even to his old age. Manius Curius Dentatus is described at length in *De Senectute* (55–56) as the ideal austere Roman farmer; in the *De Republica* (2.6) as having the wisdom of political experience rather than that of learning. C. Fabricius Luscinus is so renowned for the same virtues that he was given the exceptional honor of a tomb within the city of Rome; what is said of him is true also of his intimate friend and colleague, Quintus Aemilius Papus.

temeritas and *furor* and *amentia*.²⁶ He actually tried to seize royal power, *regnum occupare conatus est*,²⁷ and is, then, a perfect example of a man who forfeits the right to friendship. Quintus Tubero,²⁸ grandson of L. Aemilius Paulus, a Stoic disciple of Panaetius who was tribune with Tiberius Gracchus in 133 B.C., is commended for his refusal to support him (37). Those who on the contrary followed his leadership, C. Carbo, C. Cato, and especially C. Blossius, are condemned (37–39, 41).²⁹ Blossius' fate was that of Coriolanus—treason and suicide (37). Caius Gracchus, who at first did not follow in his brother's footsteps but later did so *acerrime*,³⁰ is, in the dramatic time of the dialogue (129 B.C.), still an unknown quantity, but Cicero's judgment is clear; *serpit . . . res*, an evil omen (cf. *non libet augurari*); all is tottering to headlong ruin (39, 41).

Such *improbi* should always be abandoned by their "friends," if they have any. They are accused of bearing arms against their country, attempting to gain regal power (*regnum appetens, regnum occupare conatus*: 36, 41), stirring up revolution (*rem publicam vexans*: 39). A step in the same ominous direction is voting by ballot, introduced by the Gabinian (139 B.C.) and the Cassian laws (137 B.C.), a wedge between the people and the senate, giving the mob power over important matters of state. The *populares* are *impii* because in the eyes of the *optimates* they act against the *patria* in seeking to overthrow the senatorial regime (*Phil.* 3.36). Such *impii*, *improbi* deserve a sentence equal to that of treason (41–42).

When, therefore, Laelius speaks of "our set," *nostro grege* (69), he is speaking of a power group that identifies itself with the commonweal (cf. 101). The sign of a false friend, a flatterer and a smooth speaker, is found in his political sympathies. Gaius Papirius, for example, showed his true colors when he tried to pass a law allowing the re-election of the *tribunus plebis* (95–96), as did

²⁶ Cf. *Rep.* 2.45: *victoriis divitiisque subnixus exultabat insolentia neque suos mores regere poterat neque suorum libidines.*

²⁷ Cf. the same phrase used of Sp. Cassius and Sp. Maelius, *Rep.* 2.49, 60; *regnum adpetentem*, *Lael.* 36.

²⁸ Cf. Tacitus, *Ann.* 16.22.

²⁹ In a dramatic dialogue with Laelius, Blossius asks him if he would ever set fire to the Capitol should Tiberius Gracchus desire it. "He never would desire it," is the answer, i.e., the *bonus* would never ask evil of his friend. But should Gracchus desire it, he, Blossius, would carry out his wishes because, being good, his request must be justified. Laelius calls this *nefas* (*Lael.* 37).

³⁰ Cf. *acerbus* used of Tarquin, *Rep.* 2.44.

Gaius Licinius Crassus in turning the right to vacancies in priestly offices into patronage for the people (96; cf. *Fam.* 1.2.4). Laelius, in summing up the benefits of Scipio's friendship as political agreement (*de re publica consensus*), adds the further advantages of *consilium* and *requies* in private matters and leisure; but without the first, the other two would have no relevance. The *sapientia* on which *amicitia* depends is, therefore, in large measure a political capacity and the sagacity of belonging to the right party. Cicero's enemy is not his, but the enemy of law, law-courts, peace, the *patria*, all citizens (*Fam.* 1.9.10, 5.16.5).³¹

There is no treatise *de amicitia* of St. Jerome, no unified statement of his theory or practice. His opinions, however, are given plentifully throughout his writings, especially in his letters and his prefaces. He not only speaks but thinks of friendship in Ciceronian terms. Although he was widely read in many Latin authors, after 387–389 A.D. his chief source not only for style but for facts and philosophy was Cicero. The famous dream expresses his profound dedication to Cicero as well as the interior conflict caused by it. "Christianum me esse respondi: . . . Mentiris ait, Ciceronianus es, non Christianus."³² It is a religion, to be a Ciceronian! Later Jerome was to write: "Nostis enim quod plus quam quindecim anni sunt ex quo in manus meas nunquam Tullius . . . ascendit."³³ In 389 he identifies himself with Cicero, comparing his own case to that of Cicero when charged with embezzlement.³⁴ His frequent references to the *Laelius*, collected by Lübeck, indicate familiarity with that treatise.³⁵ Of more than one passage of his it can be said, as of *Contra Iovinianum* 1.1: "Nothing in this passage reveals that it was written by a Christian or against a Christian . . .; it is the voice of an ancient rhetor who

³¹ See again Hellegouarc'h (above, note 2) 289, 303, 487–89, 531, 537.

³² *Ep.* 22.30. All references to Jerome's letters are cited from *Sancti Eusebii Hieronymi Epistolae*, ed. Isidorus Hilberg, *Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum* 54–56 (Vienna and Leipzig, 1910–18). See Harold Hagendahl, *The Latin Fathers and the Classics* = *Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis* 64 (Göteborg 1958) 176, 269, 292, 318–27. Ferd. Cavallera, *Saint Jérôme, sa vie et son oeuvre* (Paris and Louvain 1922) 1.29, puts the dream at Antioch around 374. See also Rufinus, *Apol. in Hieron.* 2.6 (*PL* 21.588) and Jerome, *Apol. adv. Ruf.* 1.30–31 and 3.32 (*PL* 23.440B–444A; 502c–503B).

³³ *Comm. in Galatas* 3, praef. (*PL* 26.399c).

³⁴ *Transl. Origenis In Lucam*, praef. (*PL* 26.229–230): "ut ait Tullius." Cf. *Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.*, praef. (*PL* 26.219).

³⁵ Aemilius Lübeck, *Hieronymus quos nouerit scriptores et ex quibus hauserit* (Leipzig 1872).

speaks, proud, supercilious, mocking.” If in Cicero political sagacity, *sapientia* (belonging to the right party), was the basis for friendship, in Jerome the place of *sapientia* is taken by *caritas*. But *caritas* for Jerome is more accurately called *timor domini* and has two aspects: the one practical, i.e., monasticism as a way, the way, of life; the other, perhaps, could be called speculative, i.e., the study of scripture. Before discussing these points, Jerome’s vocabulary of friendship will be briefly considered, and his use of *sapientia*.

Jerome often uses Ciceronian terms in speaking of friendship. *Amicitia* is love, *amor*, as it consists in union of faith and will: *eadem uelle et eadem nolle* (*Ep.* 130.12; cf. 3.1), a phrase quoted from Sallust’s *Catiline* (20.4) but also recalling *Laelius* 15: *voluntatum studiorum sententiarum summa consensio* and 103: *nihil audiui ex eo ipse quod nollem*. *Amor* (*amicitia*) is qualified as *verus, fidelis* (*Ep.* 53.1; *Lael.* 32, 65); *amor* distinguishes true from false friendships that seek only *utilitas, res*, pleasure or subtle flattery.³⁶ The word *amicus* is derived from *amor*, he says, again following Cicero.³⁷ *Amicitia* is also called *caritatis affectus*.³⁸ It has its laws: *iura* and *foedus* in Jerome, *lex, ius*, and *foedus* in Cicero.³⁹

Amicitia is expressed in *officia* (*Lael.* 49; Jerome, *Ep.* 67.1), especially in stable fidelity,⁴⁰ exhortation, and admonition: *uera amicitia, quod sentit, dissimulare non debet* (*Ep.* 81.1; cf. *Lael.* 88–96). The work of *amicitia* is to unite: *sociare, iungere, stringere*,⁴¹ by the *vinculum spiritus* (*Ep.* 62.1). Cicero’s *conglutinare* (*Lael.* 32) is in Jerome the *glutino caritatis* (*Ep.* 3.3), *Christi glutino* (*Ep.* 5.1, 53.1).

³⁶ *Lael.* 51, 79, 91–97; Jerome, *Ep.* 53.1, 68.1; *Comm. in Michaeam* 2.7 (*PL* 25.1277D–78D).

³⁷ *Lael.* 26, 29, 31–32, 100; *Fam.* 7.1.1; 9.17; Jerome, *Comm. in Michaeam* 2.7 (*PL* 25.1278A).

³⁸ *Lael.* 20, 32, 46, 102; Jerome *loc. cit.* (above, note 37). The *caritas* of Jerome is not that of Cicero. Consult *TLL*, s.v. Cicero’s *caritas* is used synonymously or in conjunction with *voluptas, benevolentia* (especially in the *Laelius*), *amor, amicitia, iustitia, communitas, societas, laus, fides, fiducia*. These terms indicate sufficiently that “affection” is an inadequate translation for the term which implies social and political relations; in fact it represents the basis of the power of kings and princes. See also Hélène Pètré, *Caritas, Étude sur le vocabulaire Latin de la charité chrétienne* (Louvain 1948) 39–40; Hellegouarc’h (above, note 2) 147–49.

³⁹ Jerome, *Dial. contra Pelagianos* 2 (*PL* 23.571A), cf. *foederare* in *Ep.* 4.1; *Lael.* 35, 40, 44. Cf. Hellegouarc’h (above, note 2) 38–40, on *foedus*.

⁴⁰ Jerome, *Comm. in Matt.* 3.19 (*PL* 26.136D): “amborum fidem”; *Lael.* 65.

⁴¹ *Lael.*: *societas* 19–20, 83–84; implied in 23; *sociis* 42, *dissociat* 74; *coniunctio* 23; *coniungendam* 26. Jerome, *Ep.* 6.1, 7.1, 60.19, 62, 82.11.

A friend is therefore *pars animae* (*Ep.* 3.3, 17.3), *dimidium animae* (*In Mich.* 2.7), an *alter ego*, (*Ep.* 105.2, cf. *Fam.* 3.15.4; 8.14.2; 7.5.1 (to Caesar!); *Lael.* 22, 23, 96).

Cicero's *sapientia* is the virtue which creates and preserves friendships: *et conciliat amicitias et conservat* (100), but Jerome's *amicitia* is the work of Christ, uniting friends (*copulare, cohaerere*) by a double *sapientia*, fear of the Lord and study of holy scripture.⁴² In Jerome's epistles this two-fold *sapientia* appears not infrequently. Scripture study that binds friends together is described by the verb *sapere*: he and Rufinus together *uel erravit uel sapuit*.⁴³ To be *con-discipulus* is to be *sodalis* and *amicus* (*Ep.* 44.1). Even to praise the labors of one who expounds the word of God requires wisdom, *sapere* (*Ep.* 1.15). An interesting parallel of two passages serves as a definition of this "wisdom," which is the opposite of carnal vice: "ama scripturas sanctas et amabit te sapientia," and "ama scientiam scripturarum et carnis vitia non amabis" (*Ep.* 130.20; 125.11). Hence in his plan for the education of a girl, study of scripture is emphasized as a protection (*Ep.* 79.3, 12; 107.7).

Knowledge of Scripture is the wisdom of God himself, for it is Christ, the power of God and the wisdom of God: "Paulus sapientiam loquitur inter perfectos, sapientiam autem non saeculi huius . . . sed loquitur dei sapientiam Christus enim dei uirtus et dei sapientia."⁴⁴ Note here, too, it is Christ known through Paul, i.e. through the Scriptures. This wisdom is true and venerable old age: "nec sapientiam canis reputes, sed canos sapientia Salomone teste" (*Ep.* 58.1). For it is acquired only by a lifetime of labor whose fruits ripen after many years. After devotion to the most intense work accompanied by prayer, then *sapientia*, like Abisag with the aged David, will warm the scholar in his declining years (*Ep.* 52.3). Hence the student, the cleric, must constantly read the Scriptures, never letting the sacred books out of his hands (*Ep.* 52.7). Such a man will reveal his wisdom even in the questions he raises (*Ep.* 21.1). Jerome himself, while modestly disclaiming the name of a Solomon, "qui et ante se et post se cunctis hominibus praefertur in sapientia," compares those who

⁴² *Ep.* 5.1, 53.1, 82.11. Cf. Pierre Fabre, *Saint Pauline de Nole et l'amitié chrétienne* (Paris 1949) 153, n. 3.

⁴³ Jerome, *Ep.* 3.1. References to *sapientia* are taken mainly from *Ep.* 1-70; an exhaustive study of Jerome's *sapientia* is beyond the scope of this paper.

⁴⁴ *Ep.* 53.4; cf. 21.39, 39.2, 119.10.

come to him for enlightenment to the queen of Sheba: "ad quarum lectionem intellexi studium reginae Saba in te esse conpletum, quae de finibus terrae sapientiam uenit audire Salomonis" (*Ep.* 121 praef.). This pursuit of wisdom he calls *mentis conuersio* in the same passage. In another passage Jerome links *sapientes*, the wise, with the *potentes* and *nobiles*; these are the monks, the men of *mentis conuersio*, and among them Pammachius is outstanding for these qualities (*Ep.* 66.4). While this is primarily a reference to 1 Cor. 1:26, it also recalls the Ciceronian *sapiens* who is noble and powerful, for such is the nature of political *sapientia* (cf. *Fam.* 5.16.5).

In other words, we cannot separate the two aspects of wisdom. Where *sapere* means primarily possession of the *timor Domini*, Jerome is speaking of monastic life, of despising this world, having a taste only for heavenly things, *quae sursum sunt* (*Ep.* 64.7); for the object of *sapere* is the substance of God (*Ep.* 31.5). In the scriptures God teaches the shortness of life that men may hasten to him, *corde sapienti*, preparing for the dread judgment (*Ep.* 140.15–16). Although he does not use the word *sapientia*, his description of monastic life implies both aspects of it: "nunc monachi incunabula moresque discutimus et eius monachi, qui liberalibus studiis eruditus in adulescentia iugum Christi collo sui inposuit," and he recommends for reading his *liber ad Nepotianum*, Epistle 52 (*Ep.* 125.8).

Wisdom, whether of life or learning, has its rival in false wisdom. This distinction is clear when wisdom is a way of life; it is more subtle when it is a question of learning. There are two ways clearly separated, one is the way of error, the other that of truth; error belongs to those who *terrena sapiunt, qui caelestia promissa non habent* (*Ep.* 148.9). True wisdom does not go on the *latam spatiosamque uiam* of destruction but condemns it. True wisdom, knowledge of the commands of God, leads us by death to life; false wisdom seduces and leads to death. True wisdom seems *stultitia* but denies the ultimate *stultitia* of worldliness (*Ep.* 121.2–3). False wisdom is sometimes equated with satanic cleverness with allusion to the serpent, wiser than all other beasts (*Ep.* 45.4, 22.29). *Calliditas, astutia, stultitia* are terms used of love of this world, a wisdom and love unsuitable for Christians (cf. *Fam.* 3.8.6; 3.10.9). The animal reference recalls Cicero's description of the bestiality of Tarquin's folly, of the *serpens* of the disaster

brought by the Gracchi, the *improbi*. The work of such false wisdom is to destroy while true wisdom builds (*Ep.* 18A.5), for *timor Domini* cuts away all corruption and lasciviousness (*Ep.* 130.13).

There is also a true and false wisdom that is learning. The words of the Lord, mocked by the wise of this world, teach fullness of spiritual wisdom (*Ep.* 30.13). Sometimes, one must state with regret, false wisdom is identified in clearly anti-semitic tones with the wisdom of the Jews and Jewish observance (*Ep.* 121.10). Other times it is exemplified by the wise men of Greek and Roman antiquity, especially Plato or Socrates (*Ep.* 52.3, 57.12, 60.14). Here we touch on the heart of Jerome's own problem, the reconciliation of profane with sacred learning, the source of his nightmare. In that dream he was accused of having read *gentilium litterarum libros*. In certain texts, aside from the emotional passages where he accuses or excuses himself, he provides a solution by an ingenious exegesis, if it can be called that, of Deut. 21: 10-13. The captive woman whom the true Israelite wishes to marry is *sapientia saecularis*, contrasted to the *sapientia Christi*. Yet she can be purified and trimmed of all that is false and superfluous—i.e. her hair shaved and nails cut—and thus made useful for Christian teaching, *ad nostrum dogma* (*Ep.* 21.13, 22.30, 66.8). Hence while the wisdom that is fear of the Lord has no part in its opposite, worldliness, the wisdom that is learning, Scripture study, may use to some extent the erudition of the "world."

Both forms of wisdom unite and separate men as friends or enemies. *Sapientia* is also suggested, as in Cicero, by the symbol of light: "scio quia nulla communio luci et tenebris est," Jerome says, somewhat insincerely, in a passionate outburst at a group of friends who had not written to him. They are light, he is darkness, unworthy of them (*Ep.* 11). Again, he says that a friend is a light to him, an eye by which he sees: "e duobus oculis unum perdidit; Innocentium enim, partem animae meae, repentinus febrium ardor abstraxit. nunc uno et toto mihi lumine Evagrio nostro fruor" (*Ep.* 3.3). He lists among the duties of a friend to sprinkle the salt of doctrine, spice for the banquet of friendship (*Ep.* 29.1). To be a friend is to know the secrets of a friend: "quia mysteria eius scire desiderabat" (*Ep.* 47.2). Pammachius' letters are most sweet to Jerome because they spur him on to study, "me ad philosophiam nostri dogmatis prouocarent," and he longs

to embrace him, his *condiscipulus*, *sodalis*, and *amicus* (*Ep.* 49.1; cf. *Cic. Fam.* 3.11.2). "You desire to be my friend," Jerome writes, "because you think I am the servant of Christ" (*Ep.* 76.3). This service includes virtue, *honestatem morum*, contempt of the world (which for Jerome means monastic life), fidelity in friendship and the love of Christ (*Ep.* 53.11). This is a curious list! Such virtue is a light, like *sapientia*, a dazzling light that his *imbecillitas* can hardly endure (*Ep.* 4.2). *Caritas* is not excluded: it is the mother of all the virtues, and therefore unites friends (*copulare*: *Ep.* 82.11). It makes for humility, and enables friends to give their hearts, *uoluntas* (*Ep.* 68.1).

These virtues are not altogether Ciceronian. Yet just as Cicero's *sapientia* on closer scrutiny is found to be political partisanship, so does Jerome's fear of God and zeal for scripture take on partisan character. What then of Christian charity? We find Jerome juggling with the evangelical precept "to turn the other cheek"; it hampered him too much.⁴⁵ He seems to have found it impossible to forgive.⁴⁶ It has been said that he did strive for the charity of a Christian but lacked the strength to overcome not only bad temper but also his cherished literary extravagances of exaggeration, lack of exactness, penchant for biting satire.⁴⁷ Jerome states very clearly the Christian position; it may be human to harbor anger but it is not Christian: "quoniam et irasci hominis est et iniuriam non facere Christiani, ad antiquum morem reuertens rursus precor, ut et diligentem te diligas" (*Ep.* 12). The Christian way is not to harm, but to love those who love you. Yet this is also a curious inversion of the evangelical text: if you love those who love you, says Christ, what do you do more than the heathen (Mt. 5:46). Jerome is implying that it is more. He does not quote the embarrassing sequel: "love your enemies, do good to those who hate you." In the preface to his commentary on Samuel and Kings, we see his conflict and his solution:

I beg you to confront with the shields of your prayers the mad dogs who bark and rage against me, and go about the city, and think

⁴⁵ Jerome, *Apol. adv. Ruf.* 3.7 (PL 23.484B); Henri Leclercq, art. "Jérôme," in *Dictionnaire d'archéologie chrétienne et de liturgie* VII 2 (1927) 2277.

⁴⁶ Gustav Bardy, "St. Jerome and Greek Thought," *Monument to St. Jerome*, ed. F. X. Murphy (New York 1952) 107.

⁴⁷ F. Cavallera, "The Personality of St. Jerome," *Monument to St. Jerome*, ed. F. X. Murphy (New York 1952) 18.

themselves learned if they disparage others. I, knowing my lowliness, will always remember what we are told [Ps. 39:2]. "I said I will take heed to my ways that I offend not in my tongue. I have set a guard upon my mouth while the sinner standeth against me. I became dumb, and was humbled, and kept silence from good words."

The opponent is a "sinner," Jerome and his words are "good."⁴⁸ His cause is identified with God's.

Jerome lays the basis of friendship in the two sapiential passions that dominated his own life: in the spread of monasticism (an organized and political form of Christian life) and in the popularization of Bible studies, both very practical forms of *sapientia*.⁴⁹ In one text he identifies these two vocations: only the poor man, i.e. the monk, can have the riches of Scripture: "I am poor and of low estate . . . it is impossible for them [his adversaries] to have the riches of Christ, that is, the knowledge of the Scriptures, and the world's riches at the same time" (*Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.*, praef.). We will look briefly at friendships related first to love of monasticism and secondly to scripture studies.

Jerome's first essay in monastic life was in his youth. Letters of that time record the very intense friendships that accompanied him to the desert: his last years in the Bethlehem monastery were also enriched by friendships old and new. But both periods also knew *inimicitia*; the *timor domini* that should unite friends, in fact, often caused their estrangement.

Jerome was in the desert only from 375 to 377. It was the desert of Colchis, fifty-two miles southeast of Antioch in a region that had towns and fertile fields as well as sandy stretches and "Saracens".⁵⁰ It was not very far from civilization, to tell the truth, and friends could visit, write and send presents (*Ep.* 5; 7.2). Monastic life, even heremetical life in the desert, did not mean for Jerome a complete break with his contemporaries. Never objective, never a purely disinterested spectator, he threw himself, even from a distance, into all the quarrels of the day.⁵¹ There were quarrels close at hand, too; for some reason the monks living around him provoked a violent outburst: beasts

⁴⁸ Trsl. by W. H. Fremantle, *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd ser., 6.490.

⁴⁹ Cavallera (above, note 47) 25.

⁵⁰ Cf. Jerome, *Vita Malchi* (*PL* 23.55A-62B); Leclercq (above, note 45) 2245.

⁵¹ Cavallera (above, note 47) 24.

would be better companions than these monks (*Ep.* 17). From his friends he demanded constant attention by visits and letters; he denounced their silence as betrayal. He wants one friend, Heliodorus, to leave everything to come to stay with him (*Ep.* 14) and uses—unsuccessfully—every motivation to get his way in a long rhetorical letter of which he is later ashamed (*Ep.* 52.1. Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 6.17.1–2; 7.4.1; 7.23.4; *Att.* 1.4). Other friends are bombarded with highly emotional accusations for not writing to him: “Wake up, wake up, shake off your sleep, send me just one page . . . if you love me, write, if you are angry at me, write—the letters even of an angry friend will be a great comfort to me” (*Ep.* 7.1). In fact, he would like to anger him, just to make him write. “Are you tired of me already? Don’t give me the excuse that you have nothing to write about; that is something to say to begin with” (*Ep.* 12). Excuses, at which he himself was adept, are the companions of negligence (*Ep.* 9). He wants long letters (*Ep.* 7.2), yet his friends don’t even send one little word, “ne unum quidem apicem” (*Ep.* 11). He has written ten times in vain to the monk Anthony (*Ep.* 12).⁵² The tone of these letters is one of rhetorical violence and of genuine self-pity; in them *amicitia* is already divisive.

At Bethlehem where he lived from A.D. 385 to the end of his life, A.D. 419, there were two independent monasteries, Paula—who had financed both—directing the women, Jerome the men (*Ep.* 108.20). Jerusalem had too many monasteries between 375 and 400, monasteries without much discipline, full of eccentrics and eccentricities and of curiosity about each other. Jerome found himself in a world of antagonisms and was undoubtedly victimized by them. On the Mount of Olives, in Jerusalem, Rufinus and Melany had their monasteries, and, at first, cordiality reigned between the two centers.⁵³ Bethlehem became a popular place to visit, pilgrims from the west would stay for weeks, months. The solitary Jerome knew all that was going on in the world, and claimed that “the most important people in the world, those of the highest rank” were flocking there (*Ep.* 103.2). This should have continued to be the most peaceful time of Jerome’s life; he could visit his cronies at will, friends relieved him of financial

⁵² Cf. Cic. *Fam.* 2.1.1, 2.4.1, 2.10.1, 7.9.1; *Att.* 1.5, 1.6, 1.9, 16.15.

⁵³ Leclercq (above, note 45) 2261, 2280–81; Cavallera (above, note 32) 1.129, note 1, and 194–95.

burdens and supplied him with secretaries, collations, transcriptions, corrections. Yet here, too, the *timor domini*, monastic life, engendered ill feeling. Jerome preached a harsh ascetic doctrine, and preached it with bitterness out of tune with the spirit of true eastern anchorites, demanding inaccessible perfection and creating sharp tensions. Jerome found nothing good but what was done in his own monastery and blamed much in Rufinus' and Melany's idea of monastic life. This led to the final break with Rufinus—like so many of Jerome's battles wholly unnecessary, provoked, it has been said, by the zeal of Jerome's friends to satisfy their need for agitation and domination.⁵⁴ In the end peace was made, but friendship was dead forever. Jerome's *timor domini* was thus as divisive as Cicero's *grex noster*.

Scripturarum studia, Jerome claimed, was the second bond of friendship. This seems at first sight to be closer to Ciceronian *sapientia*; it did indeed lead to the formation of friendships but also to more hostilities. His friendships, especially those with women to whom he dedicated some of his driest works, were undoubtedly connected with his Scriptural studies. He had to defend himself at one point for writing for women.⁵⁵ Marcella, Fabiola and others asked him for special treatises. Letters 25 to 29 and 34, for example, to Marcella, are all on Scripture and the defense of his translations. In Rome he had read *Ecclesiastes* aloud to Blessilla and later, after the girl's early death, he thought to console Marcella, her mother, by offering to put Blessilla's name in his books: her life was short but her memory should be everlasting (*Comm. in Eccles.* praef.; *Ep.* 39). When he left Rome for good at the death of his protector, Pope Damasus, he wrote of his troubles to Asella who would see good in him where others did not (*Ep.* 45).

Jerome's intimacy could be precious, yet he spared his friends no more than his enemies, expecting nothing from the latter and everything from the former, directing to himself and to the service

⁵⁴ Leclercq (above, note 45) 2281; Cavallera (above, note 32) 1.200. See however Cavallera's note 3 on the same page; and see David S. Wiesen, *St. Jerome as a Satirist, A Study in Christian Latin Thought and Letters* (Ithaca [N.Y.] 1964) 38-45. See especially *Ep.* 57.12-13 and 58.4.

⁵⁵ Jerome's preface to Zephaniah, dedicated to Paula and Eustochium, trsl. in *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* 6.502.

of his work the ideas, passions, greatness and power of others.⁵⁶ Marcella, his faithful friend, frowns when she sees him on the verge of a new quarrel, he himself admits (*Ep.* 27.2). He enjoyed a fight for its own sake, receiving as well as giving blows: "I'm glad to be hated by such people," he says, glorying in his unpopularity, and pleased when compared to Lucilius (*Ep.* 57.1). Cicero was more cautious (*Fam.* 2.18.2).

Jerome's zeal for scripture led to many battles, over translations of the Bible, over Origen, over exegesis. His translations of the Old and New Testaments were welcomed by the group of his faithful friends but received with hostility and distrust by others, including Augustine. The stronger the hostility against him, the more virulence he showed in pursuit of his course. Anyone who opposed him became almost always the lowest of mankind. Euphemistically he calls his hearty return of the antipathy of certain anonymous "two legged donkeys" at Rome his "frankness," his "freedom" (*Ep.* 27.3). The preface of his last book on sites and names of Hebrew places, surely an innocuous topic, attacks an adversary as "one who had hardly the first tincture of letters . . . his language can hardly be called Latin . . . in his lack of scholarship and style he grovels on the earth." In the preface to *Jeremiah* I, he "pays little heed to the ravings of disparaging critics"; one is an arrogant traducer, more asleep than awake, another is a stupid fool, laboring under the load of scotch porridge, *scotorum pultibus praegravatus*; this fellow's revilings are only echoes, his ignorance so deep that even his abuse is not his own.

Other adversaries are called animals, in the ancient polemic tradition. According to Bardy, Jerome's only motive in translating Didymus' treatise on the Holy Spirit was his dislike of St. Ambrose, "a certain ugly crow."⁵⁷ There are other crows beside St. Ambrose; Jerome hears on his left the raven, that ominous bird, croaking and mocking the colors of all the other birds (*Transl. Origenis in Luc. praef.*). Many serpents "drive their fangs" into his books; other hostile scholars are dogs, barking and raging against him, "barking critics" (*Job, praef.*). The devil himself barks through the hound of Albion, a mountain of fat—Pelagius (*Jerem.* 3, praef.). Still others are pigs, *inmundi sues grunniunt*, all against him, a poor little fellow, *parvum*

⁵⁶ Cavallera (above, note 47) 17; Leclercq (above, note 45) 2280, 2296.

⁵⁷ Bardy (above, note 46) 91; see Wiesen (above, note 54) 240–44.

homunculum (*Quaest. Hebr. in Gen.* praef.). After their quarrel, Rufinus is consistently called Grunnius Corocotta Porcellus. Grunnius was the subject of a song that Jerome and Rufinus had sung together as school boys; he was a young pig who bequeathed parts of himself to his friends and relations in his last will and testament (*Isaias* 12 praef.; *Ep.* 25.18).⁵⁸ After the former friend's death, Jerome comments that "the scorpion lies beneath the ground with Enceladus and Porphyryon and the many-headed hydra has ceased to hiss at us."⁵⁹ Rufinus had been his friend, he was dead—but he had followed another school.

Without attempting to go into the detail of these controversies or to evaluate Jerome's position, it would seem that active in them was a personal partisan element, in many ways understandable, but none the less unfortunate. Where Cicero identified the welfare of the state with his "party" who alone are the *boni*, Jerome tends to see his side of a theological controversy as inspired by God and infallible. And as Cicero brands the opponents of his group traitors and tyrants, so Jerome makes his opponents despicable apostates. This attitude is more Ciceronian than Christian, yet how often in the history of Christianity has it triumphed: *non Christianus sed Ciceronianus*.

⁵⁸ Cavallera (above, note 32) 1.13, note 2.

⁵⁹ *Ezek.* 1 praef. Consult Wiesen (above, note 54) throughout his chapter on "Personal Enemies," 200–46. Enemies are vilified on the grounds of their ignorance of biblical scholarship (202, 203, 217, 237), lack of literary culture (206, 210, 226, 231), sexual immorality (208, 214), avarice (212), gluttony (211, 228), personal dislike (244–45). But see his remarks on "reform" (270).